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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

During the coming winter much will be said with reference to modification,
simplification and changes generally in the federal income-tax laws. The
report of the Couzens committee is being awaited with intense interest. The
incidents associated with the inception of this committee and the newspaper
stories of the outgivings of its chairman have centered attention upon it. What
has been found and what it will report and recommend is not as yet known
with any degree of definiteness. However, it has been reported that Senator
Couzens favors the exemption of all incomes up to five thousand and a reduction
of surtaxes as much as or more than is now being contemplated by the
secretary of the treasury.
Senator Couzens estimates that if incomes up to $5,000 were exempt from
taxation, ninety-one per cent of the tax returns now made would be eliminated.
As he states, this would lift a burden of giant proportions from the personnel of
the bureau of internal revenue. It would be interesting to know whether or
not the cost of handling these returns, their examination, collection and filing
is so large a part of the revenue derived from them as to render the net
revenue insufficient to justify the expenditure of effort.
There is a theory that the obligation to pay a tax causes the taxpayer to
take a greater interest in his government than do those not taxpayers. This
theory seems to be too general to be accurate.
It is reported that Senator Smoot is in favor of the abolition of the estate
taxes and the gift taxes but that this will be opposed to a certain extent by
Senator Couzens and the bloc of which he is a representative.
Much attention is being given by those in authority in our government and
those not of that body to proposals for a more scientific basis of levying and
collecting the income taxes. One of the major problems of the treasury de
partment in its work of assessing and collecting federal taxes is that of obtaining
competent employees at the salaries that are prescribed. The vast majority of
its employees are competent but the personnel is constantly changing for the
very obvious reason that the salaries paid are below the scale of the business
and professional world. No claim is made that this discovery is original with
the writer. Everyone in contact with the taxing departments is aware of it.
It would seem to be a duty of everyone having this in mind to make his influence
felt in having this condition remedied, for with greater incentive and the
ability to get high grade employees, satisfied to remain in the employ of the
government indefinitely, there would be a great saving to the taxpayers. It
costs money to employ men and instruct them in the work they are to perform.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Under the 1918 act, an action at law may not be maintained by the United
States for an extra estate tax where the executor’s return is incorrect, without a
return by the collector and the assessment of a tax thereon by the commissioner,
as prescribed by the statute. (U. S. v. James C. Ayer, et al., in U. S. district
court of Massachusetts.)
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A partnership which carried on business solely with borrowed money had no
invested capital under the 1917 act and was subject to tax under section 209
thereof and not to any excess-profits tax. (King v. Hopkins, Collector, U. S.
district court, N. D. of Texas.)
When conservative valuations are placed upon lands by administrators in
their estate-tax returns, such valuations will not be later held excessive on their
motions although the market value of such land was greater at time of dece
dent’s death than it was before or after that date.
When the year’s taxes on real estate became a lien on May 1st of that year,
the value of the estate of a person dying after that time should have deducted
therefrom all of such taxes, notwithstanding article 40 of regulations in effect
when the taxes were paid, October 18, 1920.
When taxes were voluntarily paid but a claim for refund was made, the
question reopened by the government and a partial reduction allowed because
of certain taxes paid, the courts may allow a further reduction on account of
said taxes if considered proper. (Thompson et al. Administrators v. U. S., U. S.
district court of Minnesota, third division.)
Goodwill is not “property used in trade or business” under the act of 1918,
and an allowance for the obsolescence thereof may not be allowed because of
prohibition legislation in the case of a manufacturer of malt. (Red Wing
Malting Co. v. Willcutt, Collector, U. S. district court of Minnesota, third
division.)
Where the value of corporate stock has been increased or decreased during
the preceding year, the capital-stock tax must be based upon its fair average
value during that year which is not the same as its fair value on June 30th.
(One Liberty Street Realty and Securities Corporation v. Bowers, Collector, U. S.
district court, S. D. of New York.)
Goodwill value for purposes of invested capital cannot be established by oral
testimony or by proof of stock being issued therefor. (U. S. B. T. A. decision
666, docket 84, Pacific Baking Company.)
Earnings subsequent to the acquisitions of intangibles purchased for stock
have evidentiary value in determining the worth of such intangibles.
The commissioner has the burden of proving the facts if an affirmative de
fense is alleged in his answer. (B. T. A. decision 667, docket 1858, General Lead
Batteries Company.)
Where a taxpayer owes no obligation to declare a bonus, those declared after
the close of a taxable year are not deductible from the income of such prior year.
(B. T. A. decision 671, docket 1776, Delaware Electric and Supply Company.)
A deficiency for 1918 taxes based upon a waiver, pursuant to section 250 (d),
act of 1921, which was signed after the statutory period had elapsed was dis
allowed. (B. T. A. decision 672, docket 2420, Estate of Samuel Heinrich.)
Any formula for determining the value of intangible property acquired must
be based upon knowledge of the cost value of tangible property. (B. T. A. deci
sion 673, docket 2506, International Consolidated Chemical Company.)
Reasonable salaries agreed to by all the directors and stockholders of a close
corporation without formal action are deductible, though due to the book
keeper’s failure to follow instructions, no book entries were made until the
following year.
Unpaid salaries forgiven to a corporation may be included in invested capital
only from the date of forgiveness. (B. T. A. decision 676, docket 583, The
Parisian.)
Where a corporation holding seventy-five per cent of the stock of another
has no control over the remaining shares, the two are not affiliated under the act
of 1918. (B. T. A. 697, docket 1856, Ditter Bros., Inc.)
Amounts paid to stockholders who rendered no services are not allowable
deductions. (B. T. A. decision 681, docket 1940, Alexander Reid and Company).
A loss sustained by the cancellation of government contracts is deductible in
computing taxable income from such contracts.
A return, incorrect by reason of an error made by an inexperienced book
keeper, is not a fraudulently false one made with intent to evade the income
tax. (B. T. A. decision 687, docket 234, Gutherman Strauss Company.)
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The value of an interest at the time of a decedent’s death cannot be estab
lished by a statement showing an estimated deficit at a date several years
subsequent thereto.
Balance-sheets, net earnings, dividends, existing surplus and capital stock
tax valuation over a five-year period are more competent to show stock value
than an isolated sale made six months prior to the valuation date. (B. T. A.
decision 692, docket 1782, Walter et al., Executors.)
Taxpayer’s failure to claim a deduction for depreciation of patents in his orig
inal return does not preclude the claiming of such deduction later. (B. T. A.
decision 693, docket 1839, S. Marsh Young.)
A debt may not be deducted as worthless as long as the assets of the debtor
will permit a recovery in part. (B. T. A. decision 698, docket 3021, Equinox
Company.)
An objection to testimony of purely hearsay character as to the average rate
of tax paid by representative corporations was sustained by the board. (B. T.
A. decision 702, docket 2856, Walker Creamery Products Company.)
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3743, August 17,1925)
Article 1008: Collection of tax by suit.

Internal Revenue Taxes—Receivership—Decision of Court

An order of a state court requiring the filing of all claims in re
ceivership on or before a certain date does not apply to the filing
of a claim by the United States for unpaid taxes, as such a claim
can be filed at any time while the receivership is pending and assets
of the estate remain undistributed.
The following decision of the' appellate court of the first district of Illinois
in the case of Reinecke, Collector, v. General Combustion Co., Insolvent, is
published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District

Reinecke, Collector, v. General Combustion Co., Insolvent
[June 9, 1925]
Fitch, presiding justice: This is an appeal from an order of the superior
court directing the receiver in charge of the property of the General Combus
tion Co., an insolvent corporation, “to reject, disallow and disregard’’ the
claim of appellant as collector of internal revenue for taxes alleged to be due
to the United States.
The order recites that the matter came on to be heard in the superior court
upon the petition of the receiver for instructions as to the disposition of the
collector’s claim, which was filed on July 14, 1923; that on June 24, 1922, an
order was entered requiring all persons having claims against said corporation
to file the same on or before August 1, 1922, which order also provided that
“all persons, firms, or corporations” who shall fail to file their claims on or
before August 1, 1922, should be forever barred from sharing in the property
or assets of the corporation then in the possession of said court, and directed
that a notice thereof be published for three weeks in some newspaper of gen
eral circulation published in Chicago, Ill.; that the receiver had published
such a notice and had complied in all respects with such order; that the court
being advised that the claim so made, if allowed and paid by the receiver,
“would exhaust the assets” in the hands of the receiver, a request was made
upon the collector “to show under the law the amount of tax due, or to
submit an equitable basis of compromise authorized by the secretary of the
treasury ofthe United States of America,” and the disposition of the petition
of the receiver for instructions was continued to afford time to the collector
“to secure instructions and authority from the secretary of the treasury”;
that more than 60 days had elapsed, and that said claimant “has failed to
submit any proposition for the settlement of her claim.”
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From the terms of this order, it would appear that the chancellor deemed
the claim of appellant to be of such a doubtful character that he had sug
gested to the collector that she either “show under the law the amount of
tax due" or submit an authorized equitable basis of compromise. But the
record shows that the parties stipulated "that the only question at issue
before the court in this cause and for appeal is an issue of law, to wit, whether
or not in this, a receivership proceeding in the state court where the cause is
still pending and the assets undistributed, the order . . . requiring all persons
having claims against the General Combustion Co., insolvent, to file such claims
on or before August 1, 1922, or else be forever barred from filing such claims,
applies to the United States of America or the collector of internal revenue in
case of a claim for federal taxes.”
Such being the stipulation of the parties, the appellant has filed in this
court only a praecipe record, containing certain orders and stipulations. This
record shows that two claims were filed by appellant. The first was filed on
June 13, 1923, and is a claim of the collector against the General Combustion
Co., "bankrupt,” for an alleged capital-stock tax assessed for the year 1922,
under section 1000 of the revenue act of 1918, for $100.80 and interest. As
to this claim, the order appealed from makes no mention of it, and there is
no stipulation concerning it except that such a claim was filed. The second
claim was filed on July 14, 1923, and is a claim of the collector against said
"bankrupt” for income taxes for the year 1918, levied under the revenue
act of 1917, amounting to $12,521.41 and interest; and it was stipulated that
the tax appears in "the original income-tax assessment list for the month of
June, 1923.” This is the only claim mentioned in the order appealed from.
It was further stipulated that no actual personal notice of the limitation order
of June 24, 1922, was ever given to or served upon the collector, and that
there has been no distribution of the assets of the insolvent corporation, but
that the receiver has on hand the “sum of $14,000 cash money,” subject to
distribution.
Under the stipulation, the question of the validity or amount of appellant’s
claim is not before us. The only question is whether the federal government
is barred from asserting its claim against the assets in the hands of the re
ceiver because its claim was not presented on or before August 1, 1922, as
required by the previous order of the superior court. To this question there
can be but one answer, and that in the negative.
“The principle that the United States are not bound by any statute of
limitations nor barred by any laches of their officers, however gross, in a suit
brought by them as a sovereign government to enforce a public right or to
assert a public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt.” (U. S.
v. Beebe, 127 U. S., 338, 344.) "It is settled beyond doubt or controversy—
upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy applicable to all
governments alike, which forbids that the public interest should be prejudiced
by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided—
that the United States, asserting rights vested in them as a sovereign govern
ment, are not bound by any statute of limitations, unless congress has clearly
manifested its intention that they should be so bound. (Lindsey v. Miller,
6 Pet., 666; U. S. v. Knight, 14 Pet., 301, 315; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall.,
92; U. S. v. Thompson, 92 U. S., 486; Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281 (4
Am. Fed. Tax Rep., 4600); United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 118 U. S., 120.) No act of congress has been cited, and we
know of none, in which a contrary intention is manifested.
While counsel for the government have covered a wide field in their brief,
we are of the opinion that the above quotations are decisive as to the only
question involved on this appeal. Counsel discuss the questions, whether
state insolvency laws are suspended by the national bankruptcy act, whether
the government is entitled to priority over the claims of other creditors,
whether a notice by publication of such a limitation order is binding upon
the government, and similar questions.. None of these questions is pertinent
to the stipulated question at issue on this appeal. However, as the stipulated
extract from the "tax assessment list” is a meaningless jumble of figures,
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when separated from its context and otherwise unexplained, and as neither
the order appealed from, nor any other part of the praecipe record, shows
that any evidence was heard, we deem it not wholly obiter for us to say that it is
our understanding of the law that if the government has a valid claim against
the insolvent corporation for unpaid taxes, its claim must be proved like any
other claim, and if allowed, its claims will have priority over the claims of other
creditors (Union Trust Co. v. III. Midland Co., 117 U. S. 434; sec. 3466, U. S.
Rev. Stat.); also, that it is the right of the federal government to present its
claim for taxes at any time during the pendency of the receivership proceedings
and before the assets are distributed. (U. S. v. Birmingham Trust & Savings
Co., 258 Fed. 562, 564.)
The suggestion contained in the order that the court might require the
government to submit a proposition of settlement or compromise is clearly un
tenable. Section 3469 of the United States Revised Statutes authorizes the
secretary of the treasury to compromise claims in favor of the United States,
when recommended by the solicitor of the treasury, upon a report from a
district attorney or any special attorney having charge of the claim. But
we do not understand that it has ever been held that the court, by which a
receiver has been appointed, may require the government, as a condition to
either the filing or the allowance of its claims for taxes, to submit a proposition
of settlement.
For the reasons stated, the order of the superior court is reversed and the
cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein
expressed.
(T. D. 3744, August 17, 1925)
Article 836: Tangible property paid in: value in excess of par value of stock.
War Profits and Excess Profits Tax—Tangible Property Paid In:
Value in Excess of Par Value of Stock

Article 836, regulations 45 (1920 edition), and article 836, regu
lations 62, amended.
Article 836, regulations 45 (1920 edition), and article 836, regulations 62,
are hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 836. Tangible property paid in: value in excess of par value of stock.—
Evidence offered to support a claim for a paid-in surplus must be as of the date
of the payment, and may consist among other things of (a) an appraisal of the
property by disinterested authorities made on or about the date of the trans
action; (b) certification of the assessed value in the case of real estate; and
(c) proof of a market price in excess of the par value of the stock or shares.
The additional value allowed in any case is confined to the value definitely
known or accurately ascertainable at the time of the payment. No claim will
be allowed for a paid-in surplus in a case in which the additional value has
been developed or ascertained subsequently to the date on which the property
was paid into the corporation. In all cases the proof of value must be clear
and explicit.
(T. D. 3747, August 21, 1925)
Article 1009: Collection of tax by distraint.
Taking Seized Property from Custody of Internal Revenue Officer—
Section 71, Criminal Code—Charge to Jury

1. Where property has been seized under warrant for distraint to
satisfy an unpaid internal-revenue tax due by a corporate taxpayer,
and a portion of the property so seized is removed by an officer of the
corporation, on his own motion after the levy, his claim that the
property removed belonged to him individually is inadequate as a
defense when charged under section 71, Criminal Code, with dis
possessing or receiving property taken or detained by an officer
under the authority of a revenue law.
2. The words “rescue” and “dispossess” mean that where an
article or person has been seized and taken into custody, the forcible or
surreptitious taking of that article or that person out of the custody
of the officer then a "rescue” has occurred.
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3. Leaving property in the possession of an individual after levy
does not justify him in taking and disposing of it for his own purposes.
4. Where an individual has knowledge that a levy has been made,
but in the face of it takes goods seized under a warrant for distraint,
and on his own action, without an appeal to any court, disposes of
them, he is guilty of violating the provisions of section 71, Criminal
Code.
The following charge to the jury in the case of the United States v. Frank C.
Sauer, given by the court in a trial recently had in the United States district
court for the western district of Pennsylvania, is published for the information
of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
District Court of the United States for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. No. 283—Criminal

United States v. Frank C. Sauer
[May 5, 1925]
Gentlemen of

the

Jury:

Charge of the Court
Gibson, J

The defendant named in this indictment, Frank C. Sauer, is charged with
having on the 22d day of December, 1922—between that date and the 29th
of December, in the same year, unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and feloni
ously, in a building located at No. 1039 East Ohio street, North Side, Pitts
burgh, Pa., dispossessed and rescued certain property, to wit, five piles of hides,
which are alleged to be of considerable value, which had been distrained by a
deputy collector of internal revenue in the collection of a tax alleged to be due
on the part of the Sauer Hide Co.
The government has introduced certain testimony to the effect of the assess
ment of a tax against the Sauer Hide Co. and the issue of warrant of distraint
to the deputy collector of internal revenue, and service of that particular war
rant of distraint. I shall not undertake to detail the manner of it; you will
recollect his testimony in so far as the service is concerned. He is alleged to
have given a copy of the list of articles seized by him to the defendant, and
also to have posted the notices on the premises. A part of the property which
was distrained by him, seized under his levy, according to the testimony offered
by the government, was five piles of hides which were on the premises of this
Sauer Hide Co., on East Ohio street, in the city of Pittsburgh. As we under
stand the testimony of the defendant, there is no denial of any of the testimony
to the extent to which we have detailed it. That will be for your recollection,
however, gentlemen of the jury.
The defense is one which to the court seems inadequate, under the present
circumstances, to the effect that the defendant was the owner of the stuff
seized, that is, of this particular amount of hides, five piles of hides, and claimed
individual ownership of them. Under the circumstances, as detailed, as we
have stated before, the court has excluded evidence of that particular defense.
You are to determine here whether the government has established beyond a
reasonable doubt that on or about the particular date charged in the indict
ment, within the western district of Pennsylvania, the deputy collector of
internal revenue had distrained upon and levied upon five piles of hides, which
have been mentioned in the evidence here, and whether or not this defendant
rescued or dispossessed the collector of those hides. Now, the words “res
cued” and “dispossess” simply mean that where an article or a person has been
seized and taken into the custody of the law, if anyone forcibly or surrepti
tiously takes those articles or that particular person out of the custody of the
officer, then a rescue has occurred. You are to determine here whether or not
this defendant has taken, without lawful authority, the five piles of hides after
they had been levied upon. Now, the mere fact that they were left in posses
sion would not in any way justify his taking those goods and disposing of them
for his own purpose. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
levy was made and served upon him, and that he knowing the existence of that
levy, in the face of it, took those hides and disposed of them, without any appeal
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to any court, but upon his own motion, then your verdict in this case should
be guilty as indicted. If you are not so satisfied, under the evidence, your
verdict should be not guilty. You will, in passing upon that, however, deter
mine whether or not there is any evidence which would tend to contradict any
of the particular matters which have been alleged here in support of the
indictment.
The defendant by his counsel has submitted a point to the court and has
requested us to charge the jury in accordance with it. We have refused that
point, and do not read it.
You will take the case, gentlemen.
(T. D. 3748, August 31, 1925)
Income tax—Association distinguished from trust
Article 1504 of Regulations 65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 1504. Association distinguished from trust.—Where trustees merely hold
property for the collection of the income and its distribution among the benefi
ciaries of the trust, and are not engaged, either by themselves or in connection
with the beneficiaries, in the carrying on of any business, and the beneficiaries
have no control over the trust although their consent may be required for the
filling of a vacancy among the trustees or for a modification of the terms of the
trust, no association exists, and the trust and the beneficiaries thereof will be
subject to tax as provided by section 219 and by articles 341-347. If, however,
the beneficiaries have positive control over the trust, whether through the right
periodically to elect trustees or otherwise, an association exists within the mean
ing of section 2. Even in the absence of any control by the beneficiaries, where
the trustees are not restricted to the mere collection of funds and their payment
to the beneficiaries, but are associated together with similar or greater powers
than the directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on some business
enterprise, the trust is an association within the meaning of the statute.
(T. D. 3749, August 31, 1925)
Income Tax—Association
Article 1502 of regulations 65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 1502. Association.—Associations and joint-stock companies include
associations, common-law trusts, and organizations by whatever name known,
which act or do business in an organized capacity, whether created under and
pursuant to state laws, agreements, declarations of trust, or otherwise, the net
income of which, if any, is distributed or distributable among the shareholders
on the basis of the capital stock which each holds, or, where there is no capital
stock, on the basis of the proportionate share or capital which each has or has
invested in the business or property of the organization. A corporation which
has ceased to exist in contemplation of law but continues its business in quasi
corporate form is an association or corporation within the meaning of section 2.
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